sites of oil production culturally bereft and therefore unnarratable.
In Cities of Salt, American oilmen take over a Bedouin oasis called Wadi alUyoun: in the name of progress, they first take the wadi's water, then they take their land, and the people of Wadi al-Uyoun are soon forgotten. By displacing communities living near oil and repopulating workforces with migrant labor, Ghosh explained, twentieth-century oil companies constructed sites of production as towers of Babelplaces no worker was from, where no community could be built, and where no one intended to stay. "The novel is never more comfortable than when it is luxuriating in a 'sense of place,'" Ghosh reflected. "But the experiences associated with oil are lived out within a space that is no place at all, a world that is intrinsically displaced, heterogeneous, and international." Though dreams of oil had thrown together continents and peoples in what should have been a culturally generative exchange, Ghosh lamented, the world had been rendered functionally mute about the significance of the "oil encounter." 3 Of course, oil consumers have their stories to tell, too. More recently, oil scholars have contested Ghosh's limitation of "oil encounters" to the places where oil comes out of the ground. Oil's places of production may be traditionally dis-placed as Ghosh described, but the sites of consumption have been so pervasive for so long, they contended, that petrofiction should be a much bigger category. Energy Humanities pioneer Imre Szeman even claimed that American culture is so steeped in the 2 Ghosh, The Imam and the Indian, 75-89. On the chronology of oil drilling, see Jones, Routes of Power, 89. 3 Ghosh, The Imam and the Indian, 75, 79.
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August 2017 consumption of oil and oil-based products -based on a deep-rooted "fiction of surplus" -that petrofiction was not a genre but rather a periodization, encompassing all twentieth-century American literature, from, say, The Great Gatsby to the recent proliferation of dystopian climate fiction, or CliFi. Oil has so entangled us in an idea of energy as synonymous with progress, Szeman further argued, that our literature has been largely incapable of critique. This includes the ability to imagine a world without oil, beyond substituting as-yet-undiscovered forms of energy as a techno-fix, except as a dystopia. 4 And yet, in twenty-first century America, it is becoming less necessary to delineate sites of production and consumption in search of the "oil encounter."
Technological improvements in extraction of "unconventional" oil combined with the exhaustion of earlier reserves, stress on rural economies, and the ever-present politics of energy independence have been rapidly reshaping much of the American landscape into intimate landscapes of oil extraction, interspersed as well with other forms of energy production.
(If you keep driving west from the region of Texas captured in Hell or High
Water, pump jacks soon give way to miles upon miles of industrial wind farms.) At the same time the oil industry is increasingly taking an inclusive approach to public outreach. In this curated worldview, oil has room for everyone and is synergistic with "nature." Bringing Ghosh's insights into the twenty-first century, as the petroleum industry expands into new frontiers of unconventional oil, it is clear that the "oil encounter" has come home to the United States. Mediated by multinational oil corporations and finance, oil production is increasingly rejoining the sprawling decentralized landscapes of consumption it has been complicit in creating over the last century (see Figure 1 ). Historically-speaking, the absence of energy production from everyday life is an unusual state of affairs. Under pre-industrial energy regimes, most of the U.S. would have been a mixed landscape of energy production and consumption, relying on timber, charcoal, animal fats, feces, and labor, and other energy-rich sources from living organisms. Unlike subterranean deposits of mineral energies such as oil and coal, trees and animals need space, sun, water, and time to become useful for human needs. They are also difficult to store and transport. Older, organic energy regimes were thus by necessity landscapes of mixed production and consumption. Only in cities were people freed somewhat from the demands of securing their own energy stores in situ. In the early twentieth century, the new high energy economy made possible by oil and electricity was supposed to even out rural-urban discrepancies in quality of life.
Between newly accessible oil, which -after boom markets encouraged some creative inventing -could be easily stored and shipped, and advances in electricity transmission, which allowed for centralized generating plants serving hundreds of miles of powerlines, energy access took on the quality of a public good. Well separated from the raw and oily sites of extraction and the smoky sites of generation, rural communities still reliant on organic energy were painted as unacceptably backwards, though desirable, places to live. Mineral energy promised to relieve rural drudgery on the farm, improve sanitation and food storage, connect people to the cities and to each other -in short, it would bring the culture of the city to the bucolic health of the country, with few drawbacks.
At the same time, the possibility of a high-energy countryside fueled anti-urban sentiments. Automobiles and farm machinery in combination with radios and mechanized household appliances made dense congregations of people and industry also seem antiquated to urban reformers. On the campaign trail, Franklin D. Roosevelt waxed poetic in the 1930s about the elimination of "sweatshops and slums" through a more even distribution of everything in the countryside: through becoming more intensive energy consumers, all Americans could have a good job and own land, and the national economy would grow, too. 14 Even with the free landfill, the oil industry would prove to be the death of
Brownwood. The land around Houston is basically a sponge. But when a sponge dries, it shrinks. As industrial operations intensively consumed groundwater from the peninsula on which Brownwood was built, the neighborhood subsided 10 or more feet between the 1930s and 1980s. Flooding became more frequent, and, in the 1970s, the city of Baytown initiated talks about relocating the neighborhood.
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Many residents resisted moving. Instead, they created "survival civic associations" and petitioned the town for infrastructure upgrades to protect them from the encroaching bay. Brownwood flooded so much in those years that it had become part of the neighborhood identity to be willing to rebuild (see Figure 5 ).
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13 Interview with Linda Hannah Bossing, "Brownwood Subdivision Reunion," at 40:25. 14 Interview with Kay Carter, "Brownwood Subdivision Reunion," at 45:00. 15 Galloway, Jones, and Ingebritsen, "Houston-Galveston, Texas." Estimates of subsidence vary. 16 Interview with Jean Shepard, "Brownwood Subdivision Reunion," at 06:58; Gray, "Brownwood." Hurricane Alicia eventually sealed its fate: after three-quarters of the houses were destroyed or damaged in the storm in 1983, the federal government bought the property from the remaining resilient residents. In the 1990s, the city razed the damaged structures that still stood as reminders of the peninsula's residential past and eventually built the Nature Center, open to the public every day except Christmas.
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Baytown Nature Center tells its stories in its silences. There is no information in the park or its brochures about the peninsula's residential past. As an "oil encounter," it is, in Michael Rubenstein's typologies, "unspoken [and] unspeakable, at once too close, 17 Gray, "Brownwood"; Harden, "For years, the Houston area has been losing ground." While the Nature Center may be mute about its past, however, Brownwood has been in the news a lot recently, not because of anything new on the peninsula, but because Houston has been flooding. In the last couple years, the sprawling metropolis has had multiple "100 year rain events" in the same week; Houston's 2016 "Tax Day"
flood, which made national news, was estimated to be a "10,000 year" event. 19 In the wake of increasingly severe storms, Brownwood has become Houston's Easter Island, its cautionary tale about the hubris of bad infrastructure planning and rapid development. Land that has subsided due to groundwater depletion doesn't "bounce back," meaning that industrial uses of water in the Houston area have irrevocably lowered the elevation of Brownwood and other neighborhoods, and this unintended effect has major consequences for a coastal city in an era of sea level rise and extreme weather events. 20 As more of Houston floods more frequently, it sees its fate in the tiny spit of land that once housed oil executives and was lost to their inattention to the land outside their doorstep. I visited the museum with friends from Boston on a cold and blustery day in March, when the unseasonable chill made Galveston's industrial beaches even less appealing, as if the prominent pipelines paralleling the shoreline were not deterrent enough. The Ocean Star has a 4.5/5 rating on tripadvisor, making it the #5 thing to do in Galveston. It is still waterborne, accessible via a gangplank off a pier, past nesting pelicans, and through a gift shop selling drill bit earrings and coffee mugs. The museum itself consists of three floors, split into indoor curated exhibits and outdoor deck tours of the derrick, the drilling equipment, and the operational and safety apparatus. We were delighted to find equipment named such things as the "Iron Roughneck," "BOP Accumulator," and, my personal favorite, the "Kelly / Kelly Bushing." postmodern president. 23 The tour starts with a fifteen-minute video on the history and technology of deep-sea drilling, from which you learn that oil seepage is "natural" and has occurred without the help of humans for "millions of years." It is extracted from the sea floor with the help of "drilling mud," which only from fine print does one discover is a customizable industrial slurry. In the Environmental Area, you find that oil rigs provide safe habitat for juvenile fish, crustaceans, and mollusks. ("What lies beneath the shimmering blue waters of the Gulf of Mexico," the exhibit boldly proclaims, presumably about both fish and oil, "is a world waiting to be discovered.") 24 While diversity of perspective on the societal impact of offshore oil may not be welcome onboard the Ocean Star, the museum tries hard to be an inclusive space in other ways. The Career Corner has suggestions for how any personality type can find a satisfying place in the oil industry, whether you are "Realistic", "Investigative", "Artistic", "Social", "Enterprising", or "Conventional." The "Life on a Rig" exhibit invites you to imagine yourself as part of a jovial crew, where everyone has their special role in maintaining the high-tech floating city that ensures a steady oil supply (but also where there is plenty of fun to be had after hours). And, of course, following a more standard "fiction of surplus" narrative, the Ocean Star's "How Do You Use Oil?" diorama reminds the visitor that petroleum binds everyone together through the material comforts of a good American life: a blond Barbie doll in a bikini luxuriates amidst petroleum-based sunscreen, high-heels, golf balls, laundry detergent, paint, electronics, and crayons. No matter your politics, there is a sublime quality to offshore drilling, which the Ocean Star indulges in its beautiful panoramas, model rigs with exquisite detail in miniature, and equipment displays.
27 And yet, the billions of dollars of exploration, the massive offshore cities built only for extraction, the technologies required to go "ultradeep" for oil feel pornographic in display as much as they do impressive.
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Rethinking deep-sea drilling as a triumph of capital as much as a triumph of technology raises potential contradictions that trouble the future of oil. The need to spend "billions of dollars" on deep sea oil exploration to keep the industry afloat to some might be less a sign of the cutting edge of technology than a symptom of the "progressive closure" of "capitalism's Cheap Nature frontiers." "Cheap Nature" is a term coined recently by geographer and political ecologist Jason W. Moore to better examine the structural relationships that have led to endeavors like deep-sea drilling. Cheap Nature builds on Marxian ideas of "primitive accumulation" -the dispossession of land and labor power that created a proletariat, a class dependent on wage work and the market for a livelihood -and refers to the extensive resources (which include, Moore highlights, many of the displaced peoples) appropriated through force or taken for free as "raw materials" that have gone into creating the worlds' commodities and enabled capital accumulation. Even as he details the violence of an economic system reliant on 26 Mazerov, "Oil/gas industry knows it has a crisis of image." 27 On oil rigs and the "oceanic sublime," see Farquharson, "North Atlantic Sublime: Possibilities and Pitfalls for Ocean Policy." 28 On a critique of "ultra-deep" drilling, see LeMenager, Living Oil.
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August 2017 continual inputs of Cheap Nature, however, Moore suggests that this "audacious act of global bookkeeping" may be reaching its end.
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If so, the oil industry's self-promotion subsequently becomes, not a celebration of human ingenuity, but a testament to the lengths to which people will go to keep an industry alive. What is clear is that, within the American oil industry and the regulatory state that manages it, the boundaries between raw materials and wilderness, and between raw materials and spaces of domesticity, are rapidly thinning. 29 Moore, "The Rise of Cheap Nature," 91-92. In the film's sparse slow dialogue, it unfolds over time that the brothers are acting out of more than sentimental attachment to family land and a few "skinny cows."
Chevron has identified an oil deposit on their land and wants to lease it for drilling. It's a big find -an estimated 2000 barrels a month -and Toby seizes on this lease as a way for his sons to escape the grinding cycle of rural poverty he feels has plagued his family 30 For a detailed discussion on the production of the film and the characteristics of the "modern frontier" Sheridan wrote it to explore, see In fact, the film warns you early on that its happy ending is tenuous at best. After the first morning of successful heists, Toby lingers at a diner, where a sweet but tiredlooking waitress strikes up a conversation. Being post-recession Texas, it quickly trends towards the vagaries of the energy industry:
"What do you do?" the waitress asks, just making small talk.
When Toby tells her his "last job was for a natural gas company," she responds with admiration, "Sounds high dollar."
"No, there ain't nothing high dollar about drilling," he replies. "No one seems to be drilling for gas now anyway."
"They're sure drilling for oil," she protests, indignant on his behalf. "I mean, ain't one drill the same as the next?"
He smiles: "That's my take on it. Guess I gotta get someone else to believe me."
"We could use a cook," she says sympathetically, handing him the check. "Just a 
Re-encountering Oil in the Twenty-first Century
What can we learn from these American "oil encounters"? From the new landscapes of production? From the cultural spaces built on oil ruins -the museums, the wildlife sanctuaries?
In Hell or High Water, oil production is the basic infrastructure of the modern 38 Created using data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Western, an unglamorous encounter between rural poverty and global finance that is merely playing out the latest structural episode of colonization and displacement. On the Ocean Star, oil production is beautiful, natural, benign, and holds a place for everyone.
Without the distance of time or space, truth is still political there -power scripts the encounter and the materiality of production is hidden in innocuous terms like "mud." In Baytown, the encounter is a silencing. A place where hundreds of employees raised their families, sat on their docks, gazed across the bay, has been rewritten to be a timeless sanctuary, proof that industry and wildness can peacefully coexist. In these aquatic-industrial spaces, in the ruins of sunken neighborhoods, around the perpetual motion of pump jacks, new life flourishes, but nothing is sacred about what has been displaced.
Unless we can build new civic norms that encourage meaningful conversations about structural change, the future will likely hold a much more integrated built environment of production and consumption -on the techno-optimistic end, solarpowered roof tiles sending energy to a Tesla home battery that powers our self-driving cars and feeds energy back into our neighborhood microgrid when necessary; on the eco-pessimistic end, an unrelieved landscape of drilling and fracking in our backyards, national parks, and waterways, interconnected by a transcontinental spider's web of corporate pipelines on federal lands repossessed from those least able to fight for it.
Somewhere in the middle is cows and children playing happily around pump jacks that allow small ranchers to keep their private lands from being repossessed by the rural arms of international finance.
Honestly, these are not as different as one may think: all have the capacity to be quite dystopian. Imagine, for example, the potential externalities of a "like Uber, but for solar!" energy economy. They are connected in their shared visions of encounter, in reconnecting production and consumption in a way that makes market sense. The problem is, things tend to make market sense when they provide areas of market growth -that is, commodifying formerly non-market or quasi-market amenities, such as open green space and the household, groundwater, or the ocean floor.
If this is indeed our future, then the twentieth century's silences on the cultures of oil production will represent a strange period of American history, where energy production and consumption were spatially separate, in some places, for some people.
Examining how cultural meaning is made at the sites of oil production is thus critical for teaching us to start conversations about the future of production in our daily lives.
The big lesson as I see it is this: imagining a world without externalities from energy production is naïve. Renewables won't get us there; the only realistic practices that will are policies of degrowth and culture shifts towards reduced consumption. 39 If that isn't a path we can stomach as a society, then we need to have serious conversations about fair property rights and meaningful compensation, as well as more authentic spaces to collectively envision and debate what we want our world to look like, and at what cost. 39 Recently, an interesting line of research at the intersection of climate change policy and energy history has begun to explore the relationship between energy use and happiness -a topic rich for storytelling if there ever was one. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there seems to be a tipping point, past which increased energy usage decreases happiness. Andrew Nikiforuk, for example, suggests that high-energy societies are characterized not by freedom from drudgery, but rather by "brutal mechanical slavery…dependent on a technocracy." These societies forget, he argues, that many qualities that make a good life are measured in freedom, not accumulation: freedom from stress, from risk, from transience. See Nikiforuk, The Energy of Slaves, 222-3, 227.
